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Abstract
Research on policy reinvention tends to focus on whether policies become more or less com-
prehensive over time while neglecting to explain copying policy language verbatim. We argue
that the extent to which lawmakers reinvent policy depends on the resources available to them.
Lawmakers serving in more professional state legislatures have greater capacity to reinvent poli-
cies. In contrast, lawmakers serving in less professional settings are more likely to copy policy
language. As evidence, we gather bill texts of 12 policies that diffused across the 50 states
between 1982 and 2014. Using cosine similarity scores to measure language copying, we find
that less professional legislatures copy more text from previous adopters, and that the likeliest
culprit is a lack of funding for staff assistance. The findings have implications for states’ ability
to amend policies to suit their own citizens’ needs.
Keywords: policy reinvention, legislative professionalism, text analysis, state politics
As policy ideas diffuse from one state to others, lawmakers tend to adjust the content of
the policy to fit the political and economic circumstances of their own states (Boehmke 2009;
Carley, Nicholson-Crotty, & Miller 2016; Clark 1985; Glick & Hays 1991; Hays 1996; Karch
2007; Mooney & Lee 1995; Taylor, Lewis, Jacobsmeier, & DiSarro 2012). Political scientists
have traditionally viewed reinvention as a process of social learning through which later adopting
states make adjustments that are increasingly comprehensive and converge upon an optimal
policy (Glick & Hays 1991; Mooney & Lee 1995). However, researchers have noted that as
some states reinvent policy ideas, others simply adopt policies with language copied and pasted
from previous adopters’ bills (Hertel-Fernandez 2014; Hertel-Fernandez & Kashin 2015; Kroeger
2015). Why do some states reinvent policy while others copy it verbatim?
In this study, we are interested in exploring how legislative institutions create incentives for
lawmakers to copy language from other states and, consequently, disincentivize policy reinven-
tion. We argue that states with less professional legislatures will be more likely to copy language
from previous adopters. Features of professional legislatures, like extended time in session and
greater staff assistance, give lawmakers greater opportunity to identify social problems and
consider policy solutions, including those advanced in other states. Lawmakers facing similar
policy problems in less professional legislatures have a reduced capacity to reinvent policy, and
are more likely to borrow policy solutions with few changes from other states.
For evidence, we turn to the texts of nearly 400 bills for 12 policies that diffused across
the states between 1982 and 2014. We calculate cosine similarity scores, a method used to
detect plagiarism, to determine the amount of copied text in passed versions of state legislative
bills. Analyzing the data using a Heckman selection model to distinguish factors that lead to
bill adoption and text copying, we find strong support for our hypothesis that less professional
legislatures copy more text from previous adopters. The results suggest that a lack of resources
for legislative staff could be responsible for that relationship, though the findings on this point
are not conclusive.
This study contributes a new strategy for measuring policy reinvention, adding to a growing
body of research that uses text analysis methods to study and understand how and why policies
diffuse across states (Garrett & Jansa 2015; Hertel-Fernandez & Kashin 2015; Kroeger 2015).
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It also provides evidence that better-resourced state legislatures tend to be more innovative
because they have greater staff resources. Although it is popular to slash legislative staff
budgets, or let them stagnate, doing so can curb the legislature’s ability to innovate in policy
and to address emerging social problems.
Legislative Professionalism and Reinvention
As policies diffuse across states, lawmakers borrow not only ideas but also exact language from
legislation in other states. In some cases, this practice saves lawmakers the time and effort
of crafting new policy language when model text already exists. Borrowing exact language at
best indicates that lawmakers have consciously decided that the bill text from another state
will suit their own political needs and their state’s policy needs. At worst, however, borrowing
exact language might indicate thoughtless adherence to a political stance, lazy lawmaking, or
even ignorance of the exact implications of a bill’s content for one’s own state.
For example, Indiana’s controversial Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) included
borrowed provisions defining corporations as people, and that religious freedom could be used as
a defense in cases not involving the government.1 Soon after passage, it became apparent that
the borrowed provisions, when combined into a single bill, provided enough leeway for businesses
to legally discriminate against LGBT citizens. Lawmakers quickly passed an amendment that
clarified the legal language.2 In another instance, Governor Jay Nixon of Missouri vetoed a bill
because it referenced the wrong federal statute.3 This significant error had been copied and
pasted by Missouri lawmakers from an American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) model
bill.
Copying language also has potential unintended consequences in states where the demo-
graphic or regulatory context differs from earlier adopters. When it comes to demographics,
the target populations intended to benefit from a policy vary in character across states. A
one-size-fits-all approach to policy might not serve the interests of the target population in a
copying state in the same way it did in the innovating state. When it comes to implementation,
existing laws and organizational structures may interfere with the execution of new policies
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written with language tailored for other contexts. Since states tend to borrow language from
one another, and may do so with haste and without regard for errors, it is important to know
what leads to more or less text borrowing overall. Understanding why state lawmakers borrow
legislative language whole cloth, rather than adapting policy ideas to fit the specific needs of
their constituents, can help scholars and practitioners improve policymaking and governance
at the state level.
We expect that institutional resources affect lawmakers’ likelihood of copying policy lan-
guage by altering the time and information available to them as they assess the strengths and
shortcomings of new policy ideas. Professional legislatures tend to provide greater institutional
resources, including higher funding and longer sessions that allow lawmakers and their staffs
to spend time and attention on policy, than citizen legislatures (Squire 1992). Greater insti-
tutional resources allow lawmakers and their staffs the ability to receive more policy-relevant
information from a variety of sources (whether newspapers, lobbyists, colleagues, or national
organizations) and, crucially, to act on that information during the legislative session. There-
fore, states with more professional legislatures will be more likely to reinvent policy to suit their
particular needs and goals.
Although the policy reinvention literature explores why states amend and adapt policy ideas
borrowed from their peers (Carley et al. 2016; Clark 1985; Glick & Hays 1991; Hays 1996; Karch
2007; Mooney & Lee 1995; Taylor et al. 2012), researchers have not rigorously tested the role
of resources. The major question arising from the reinvention literature is, to what extent does
learning over time affect the contents of diffusing policies? Glick and Hays (1991) and Mooney
and Lee (1995) argue that policies become increasingly comprehensive over time as lawmakers
learn and add on their own changes to the innovations of early adopters. In contrast, Clark
(1985) suggests that later adopting states will be unlikely to shift the status quo quite so far
as innovating states, resulting in less comprehensive policies over time. In both cases, research
aims to predict the general direction that policy reinvention will move. However, it does not
try to explain the variation in states’ decisions to reinvent or copy policy as it diffuses.
Research on the factors that explain this variation is scant. Hays (1996) provides evidence
that states with greater social need for a policy tend to adopt less comprehensive policies than
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innovating states. However, the study finds inconclusive evidence on the role of professionalism
and ideological differences between states.4 More recently, Carley et al. (2016) point out that
factors internal to a state, such as party politics, administrative institutions, and economic
considerations, also bear on the decision to reinvent a policy.
The broader literature on policy diffusion—which tends to focus on the spread of policy ideas
rather than contents of policy itself—often suggests that resources are important to states’ abil-
ity to innovate. With more available resources, legislators can engage in serious discussions of
policy with staff, colleagues, and stakeholders. Longer session lengths and larger staff budgets
give bill sponsors more time and assistance to research and craft novel policies while reserving
adequate time for constituent service, public appearances, and fundraising. Even for non-
sponsors, more time and resources gives lawmakers greater opportunity to vet their colleagues’
proposals and offer amendments. As a result, professional legislatures innovate more in policy
and rely less on peer states for policy ideas. This explanation is supported by the correlation
between state policy innovativeness and professionalism (or its correlate, available fiscal re-
sources) present across multiple studies (Clark & French 1984; Desmarais, Harden, & Boehmke
2015; Gray 1973; Ka & Teske 2002; Walker 1969).
Though scholars generally agree that resources allow for greater innovation, the evidence
supporting that conclusion is surprisingly mixed. Many studies omit a variable for resources
or professionalism from their models altogether (Balla 2001; W. D. Berry & Baybeck 2005;
Boehmke & Witmer 2004; Mooney 2001; Volden 2006), while others find a null or even negative
relationship between professionalism and innovation (Boehmke & Skinner 2012; Boushey 2010;
Desmarais et al. 2015; Haider-Markel 2001; Karch, Nicholson-Crotty, Woods, & Bowman. 2016).
Few have articulated hypotheses in contrast with the conventional wisdom in the field. It could
be the case, for example, that resources play no systematic role in enabling states to innovate or
reinvent policy; rather, professionalized state legislatures both innovate and borrow at the same
frequency as their peer legislatures. Another possibility is that professional legislatures may
also have greater capacity to monitor policy implementation and revise policy down the road if
needed, making it less costly to copy and paste from other states. More professional governments
often become earlier adopters of diffusing policies (e.g. Shipan & Volden 2006, 2008, 2014),
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suggesting a tendency to borrow and borrow quickly. Though these alternative relationships
remain in the realm of possibility, we expect that the greater resources for policymaking that
professional legislatures offer should create more opportunity for changes to bill text.
Professionalism Hypothesis: As legislative professionalism increases, policy language in ap-
proved bills will be less similar to the policy language approved in previously adopting states.
Staff Expenditures, Session Length, and Salary
Professionalism is typically conceptualized as being marked by three components: session
length, staff expenditures, and the salaries paid to lawmakers (Squire 1992). Bowen and
Greene (2014) warn that researchers studying professionalism should think carefully about
whether these components individually contribute to the outcome of interest (see also Carnes
& Hansen 2016; Kousser & Phillips 2009). Though we expect that more professional legislatures
on balance will copy less language, we do not expect all three components to affect reinvention.
One facet of professionalism likely to have a substantial effect on language borrowing is
staff expenditures. Legislatures with more funding for research centers, committee personnel,
and personal legislative aides likely have a greater capacity to research, innovate, and reinvent
policy solutions for their jurisdictions. Further, those legislatures will be more able to hire pro-
fessionally trained individuals, compensate them well, and give them the resources to succeed.
Legislatures with small, cash-strapped, amateur staffs may have to rely more on the work of
previous adopters as beginning templates for their work. In sum, states that dedicate fewer
resources to legislative staff will be more likely to borrow from other states. We state this
hypothesis formally below.
Expenditures Hypothesis: As legislative staff expenditures increase, policy language in ap-
proved bills will be less similar to the policy language approved in previously adopting states.
Another important component of professionalism is session length. Lawmaking is an ardu-
ous, time-consuming process. Despite the time demands, legislators must also devote significant
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time to politics, including running for reelection, interacting with constituents, fundraising, and
building support for policy proposals within their chamber. Needing to accomplish both policy
and political goals in a time-constrained environment, legislators and their staff may decide to
copy policy language from existing sources rather than writing policies anew. The more time-
constrained a legislator is, the more likely he or she is to look for these shortcuts to solving
social problems.
Session length varies across states. Some states give legislators a few months every two years
to deliberate on policy; other states meet year-round. States that have longer sessions give their
legislators the time needed to draft, debate, revise, and consider more innovative proposals be-
fore adjournment. Though legislators spend time thinking about and drafting policy outside of
session, the legislature collectively spends less time deliberating and amending policies proposed
by members when facing short bill passage deadlines before required adjournments. We expect
states with longer sessions will be less likely to borrow language from other states. We state
this hypothesis formally below.
Session Hypothesis: As legislative session length increases, policy language in approved bills
will be less similar to the policy language approved in previously adopting states.
The final component of professionalism is the salary paid to lawmakers. Unlike the other
two components, we have little reason to expect that what lawmakers are paid corresponds to
legislatures’ likelihood to reinvent policy.
Legislators are paid the same at the end of the year regardless of the number of bills they
introduce and pass, meaning there are no monetary incentives for them to copy and paste bills
verbatim from other states. There are also no salary-based incentives to spend time crafting
a policy reinvented from another jurisdiction. If there were any reason to suspect that salary
matters, it would be that greater salary allows for greater policy expertise among legislators,
perhaps by attracting more skilled professionals to run for office (Carnes & Hansen 2016).
However, professional skills and training do not guarantee policy expertise across issue areas.
Furthermore, we cannot point to any evidence that shows that legislators with professional
backgrounds write more original or better quality policy bills than legislators without profes-
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sional backgrounds. In short, we expect salary to have no bearing on language borrowing in
states.
Salary Hypothesis: As legislative salary increases, policy language in approved bills will be
neither more nor less similar to the policy language approved in previously adopting states.
Research Design and Data
To test our hypotheses, we measured the similarities in language in twelve policies that diffused
across multiple states. Table 1 displays the selected policies, as well as the time periods of
diffusion, descriptions of each policy, and which (if any) interest groups propagated model
legislation for the policy.5
We do not claim these policies to be representative of all state policies. The universe of
state policies is unknown, making it difficult to assess how representative this set of policies is
to all other policies. Researchers simply do not know the sampling frame from which to pull
a random sample of state policies, and thereby ensure a representative sample. This is not
a new problem in the study of policy diffusion and reinvention. Policy diffusion research in
general suffers from a “pro-innovation” bias in that nearly all studies examine a single policy
that successfully diffused (Karch et al. 2016) which is almost certainly unrepresentative of state
level policies. We can claim, however, that our sample is reasonably well-balanced on a number
of factors, giving us essentially a quota sample of state policies.
We selected policies that varied on key factors, including whether the policy addressed an
economic or social issue; whether the policy was backed by an interest group’s model legislation;
the rate of diffusion; how many states the policy diffused to; and the ideological direction of the
policy.6 An additional strength of our research design is its scope. By analyzing twelve policies,
our study also provides a substantially larger scope than previous studies of policy reinvention
(e.g. Hays 1996) and most diffusion studies, with some exceptions (Boehmke & Skinner 2012;
Desmarais et al. 2015; Karch et al. 2016), thus yielding much more generalizability than most
studies.
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[Table 1 about here.]
For each policy, we gathered observations in state-years, similar to an event history analysis
(EHA) data framework. Observations were recorded for all states beginning in the year that
the first state adopted a given policy and proceeding until the year that the most recent state
adopted or 2014, whichever occurred first. When a state selected into adopting a policy, the
state was removed from future year observations (as in an event history data set). Observing
the full range of state-years for all 12 policies yielded more than 5700 observations of policy-
state-years.
However, our observations of language diffusion are censored based on whether the state
adopted a policy. In order to model the diffusion of policy language, we turn to a Heckman
selection model (Heckman 1979). We assume language borrowing occurs as a two-stage process.
In the first stage, state legislatures select into adopting another state’s policy idea due to
learning, competition, or emulation. In the second stage, legislatures decide how much language
to borrow from the previous state. This follows an interpretation that states adopt diffusing
policies based primarily on lawmakers’ impressions of the content, with less regard for the
specific content of the policy itself. In this interpretation, policy adoption occurs because a
majority of lawmakers support the policy idea. The particular policy language would emerge
as a product of the legislative process that transmits ideas into laws.
Such a two-stage process has been theorized in previous work, though not explicitly modeled.
Karch (2007) argues that the decision to adopt is separate from decisions about policy content,
or what the bill actually says. Carley et al. (2016) also demonstrate that differing factors account
for the decision to adopt than for the decision to reinvent policy. Though they adopt a dyadic
modelling approach, they write that, “It is not merely plausible but logically necessary that
these [adoption and reinvention decisions] are in fact distinct sequential decisions, as lawmakers
first decide that they want a general class of policy, then decide what the specific characteristics
of that policy should be” (23).
An additional reason to support this modelling assumption is that many collective decisions
in state legislatures are based on pressures besides the language of a bill, such as party (e.g.
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Lee 2009) or constituency pressures (e.g. Fenno 1978), or external pressure from the federal
government (Gray 1973). Ideally, legislators would decide to vote for or against a given bill
based in large part on the language of the bill itself. However, it is quite reasonable to assume
that on many bills, most legislators who support or oppose the general idea of a bill will not be
swayed from their original stance by changes to the wording. Partisan lawmakers might also
vote for a bill that party leadership approves, regardless of the specific content.
Of course, there are exceptions. Often a bill can be passed or defeated by changes to
the wording that move a small number of legislators between “yea” and “nay.” Even if a
lawmaker disagrees with some parts of a bill, their disagreement with the wording will likely
neither change their ultimate support for or opposition to a bill, nor motivate them enough to
introduce an amendment—especially under pressure from other political actors. It is important
to model both the decision to adopt and the similarity of the policy to previous adoptions, as
the Heckman model allows.
Stage 1: Policy Adoption
In the first stage, we model a state’s decision to select into adopting a given policy. The de-
pendent variable in the first stage is a binary indicator of whether the state adopted the policy
in a given year. In this study, we are not so interested in explaining why states adopt certain
policies or in distinguishing between mechanisms of diffusion as we are interested in explaining
why states copy language. However, modeling the decision to adopt in the first stage is impor-
tant to obtaining accurate estimates for the factors that influence text borrowing in the second
stage. Thus, we include several explanatory variables that capture states’ potential motivations
for adopting a diffusing policy: competition, social learning, and emulation. According to a
meta-analysis of the diffusion literature from Maggetti and Gilardi (2015), quantitative mea-
sures of these concepts are inconsistently applied and frequently overlap. We include several
variables from the literature previously found to be associated with policy adoption, but make
no claims about which specific mechanisms these variables represent.
We include a variable to measure whether bordering states have previously adopted the
policy under observation. The variable Border is a binary variable, with values of 1 indicating
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that at least one bordering state has previously adopted the policy. Many scholars find it to be
a good predictor of state policy adoption (Baybeck, Berry, & Siegel 2011; Carley et al. 2016;
Karch et al. 2016; Shipan & Volden 2014), though others caution against relying solely upon a
bordering states to measure or explain diffusion (Desmarais et al. 2015; Gilardi 2016; Volden,
Ting, & Carpenter 2008).
States often adopt policies that ideologically similar states have adopted (Grossback, Nicholson-
Crotty, & Peterson 2004; Pacheco 2012), regardless of whether the previous state can provide
evidence that the policy was successful in achieving social or economic goals (Volden et al.
2008). Therefore, we also include the variable Ideological Distance. This is calculated as the
difference in government ideology between the observed state and the initial adopter on a policy,
as measured using estimates from W. D. Berry, Ringquist, Fording, and Hanson (1998). We use
the distance to the initial adopter because the first state sets the stage for the diffusion process
and signals the ideological direction of a bill to all subsequently adopting stats. Using the same
data source, we also include the variable Government Ideology in the observed state-year, with
higher values indicating more liberal governments.
Wealthier states may be more likely to adopt new policy innovations because a larger base
of revenue ensures that more funds will be available for policy implementation (F. S. Berry
& Berry 1990; Boehmke 2009). We measure state wealth using state Per Capita Income in
$10,000s. Data come from the federal Bureau of Economic Analysis. Estimates are adjusted
for inflation.
Interest groups and interstate organizations sometimes propagate model legislation, which
reduces the costs of policy drafting for potential bill sponsors (Garrett & Jansa 2015; Hertel-
Fernandez 2014). The existence of model legislation also indicates a broad effort by these
organizations to lobby multiple state legislatures to adopt their preferred policies. We include
Model Legislation as an indicator variable, with values of 1 marking the existence of model
legislation for the policy in question. Political organizations created such texts for six of our 12
policies.7
Finally, the temporal rate of diffusion varies across policies (Boushey 2010). We include
variables for time and its squared value, to account for overall time passed and over-time
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changes in the rate of diffusion. Time is measured as a count of the years passed between the
observed state-year and the year of the innovating state’s adoption.
Stage 2: Language Similarity
In the second stage, we measure reinvention by estimating how much language an adopting
state borrowed from a previously adopting state using computerized text analysis. Previous
research has measured reinvention by coding provisions of diffusing policy and counting how
many of the provisions appeared in the policies of both earlier and later adopters (Boehmke
2009; Glick & Hays 1991; Hays 1996; Mooney & Lee 1995; Taylor et al. 2012). However, coding
schemes have the potential to focus attention on certain salient sections of a policy and ignore
intricacies of language. Our approach captures reinvention by comparing all policy language in
one bill to all policy language in another bill and removing human interpretation of the content
from the measurement process.
Dependent Variable
Our dependent variable is a continuous measure of the similarity of the text to the most similar
previous text. We gathered the bill texts from all states that adopted a given policy.8 Once the
bill texts were collected, they needed to be prepared in order to facilitate comparison.9 Then,
we calculated a similarity score between each pair of state bills.10
The method of comparison we used is cosine similarity, a common plagiarism detection
technique that has previously been used to analyze the similarity of bills in the study of diffusion
(Garrett & Jansa 2015). The cosine method produces a vector of word frequencies in one text
and compares it to the vector of word frequencies from another text. It does this by taking
the product of the two vectors divided by the matrix norm of the two vectors. The result is a
similarity score that can range from 0 to 1. The calculation of a cosine similarity between two
hypothetical word frequency vectors, A and B, is shown in Equation 1.
CosSim(A,B) =
A ∗B
||A|| ∗ ||B||
=
n∑
i=1
Ai ∗Bi√
Σni=1(Ai)
2 ∗
√
Σni=1(Bi)
2
(1)
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The scores themselves are similar to Pearson correlations except that they change with shifts
in the scale of A or B.11 We think it is most useful to consider the similarity scores as a relative
measure of how similar the two texts are, with the score of 1 indicating identical texts (in terms
of the frequency of words used), and the score of 0 indicating no similarity.12
Cosine similarity is sometimes referred to as a “bag of words” approach in that it compares
texts using counts of word frequencies rather than strings of words. Scholars have found that
cosine similarity achieves a medium to high plagiarism detection rate, especially in instances
of copy-and-paste plagiarism (Potthast, Stein, Eiselt, Barron-Cedeno, & Rosso 2011). Since we
are examining the degree of similarity between state adoptions of defined policies, the relative
similarity measure produced by the cosine method is ideal for our application.
With all the bills compared, we set out to construct our dependent variable Similarity Score.
To do this, we calculated the similarity score for each dyad formed by the observed state and
all previously adopting states.13 Then we identified the largest similarity score, assuming it
represented the greatest possible amount of emulation of a previously adopting state’s language
and assigned it as the dependent variable for the observed state. In doing so, we depart from
previous research that uses observations of all possible state dyads to infer diffusion networks
(Desmarais et al. 2015; Volden 2006). However, using all possible dyads might provide evidence
of copying where no copying occurred, especially since our method will report some similarity
in word use in every dyad due solely to the fact that these diffusing policy bills discuss similar
topics. By measuring each observation of bill adoption using the most likely instance of copying,
we reduce the likelihood of obtaining spurious results.14 We transformed the dependent variable
from 0 to 1 scores to a 0 to 100 scale for simpler presentation of results in subsequent tables.
[Figure 1 about here.]
Figure 1 provides an illustration of how the measure works. The figure shows a portion of
the 1999 Texas safe haven law compared to the 2000 Indiana safe haven law. The similarity
score between the two bills is 71.2, which is a relatively high degree of similarity overall and on
safe haven laws in particular.15 While there is clearly language copied directly from Texas’ law,
Indiana’s law provides a lower age requirement for taking infants into custody and includes
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language protecting the identity of the individual who left the infant. We will revisit this
example in the results section of the paper.
Independent Variables
To test the professionalism hypothesis, that more professional state legislatures borrow less
language from previously adopting states, we turn to the updated index of Professionalism
calculated by Squire (2007) for the year 2003. The Squire index measures staff resources, session
length, and salary as a comprehensive measure of professionalism. The Squire index values vary
across states, but produce only one value per state over time.16 To account for potential year
to year variation in professionalism, we also employ Bowen and Greene’s (2014) professionalism
index. Their index is measured for each state biennially, by taking the first dimension in the
multidimensional scale of staff expenditures, session length, and salary. However, Bowen and
Greene’s measure contains missing values across state-years. Given the shortcomings of each
index, we report the results using both measures.
Bowen and Greene (2014) also provide data on each component part of professionalism,
which we used to test our associated hypotheses. Staff Expenditures are per-legislator staff
funding, not including legislative salaries, in hundreds of thousands of constant 2010 dollars.
Session Length is the number of days the legislature met in the two-year period. Salary is
measured as legislators’ base pay in thousands of constant 2010 dollars. We consider these
variables both individually and jointly in the models below.
We include four control variables in the second stage of the model to capture factors that
might also lead states to copy more language from previous adopters. States may be more likely
to see policy language converge over time as learning occurs and later adopting states arrive
at a consensus that a certain type of language is necessary to achieve a desired effect of policy
(Clark 1985; Glick & Hays 1991). We include two variables to capture temporal convergence.
The first is Time, which as in the first stage of the model is the count of years between the
observed state-year and the year of the innovating state’s initial adoption. The second is Order,
which is simply the order, one through fifty, in which the states adopted the policy over time.
States that adopt a policy in the same year are assigned the same value for this variable. We
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include the order variable in addition to the time variable to account for the fact that policies
diffuse at varying rates (Boushey 2010). The variables positively correlate only moderately at
r = 0.30.
The third variable we include is an indicator for Model Legislation, also included in the first
stage and described above. Again, model legislation is specifically written to reduce costs of
time and effort on the part of bill sponsors. The propagation of model legislation, if successful,
should lead to more similarly worded policies emerging from state legislatures, as legislators are
more likely to be working off a common model when drafting their legislation if there is interest
group sponsored model legislation on the issue.
The fourth variable we include is an indicator for Term Limits. Term limits put constraints
on lawmakers’ ability to innovate on policy by giving them less time to develop deep policy
expertise and relationships with their fellow lawmakers (see Carey, Niemi, Powell, & Moncrief
2006; Kousser 2005). This may constrain legislators’ ability to craft original policy language in
their own office or with colleagues. Supporting this idea, Garrett and Jansa (2015) find that
states with term-limited legislators were more likely to borrow language on diffusing policies.
Values of 1 for this variable indicate that a state has term limits imposed for the observed
year.17
Results
Table 2 presents the results of the Heckman selection model.18 The upper panel of the table
presents coefficient estimates for variables predicting state selection into policy adoption, while
the lower panel presents estimates for variables predicting language copying. Robust clustered
standard errors, clustered by state, are presented in parentheses.19 Model 1 presents the es-
timates for the model using the Squire index. Model 2 presents the estimates for the model
using the Bowen and Greene index. Both of these models test the professionalism hypothesis.
Models 3 through 5 test the expenditures, session length, and salary hypotheses in that order.
We estimated an additional Model 6 as a placebo test to assess whether results in Models 3,
4 and 5 were being driven by the unmodeled endogenous relationship between professionalism
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components.
An assumption of a Heckman selection model is that the data are distributed bivariate
normal. The results of a Doornik-Hansen test of multivariate normality showed that our data
violated the distributional assumptions of the Heckman model. We replicated the results from
Table 2 using a robust sample selection model developed by Zhelonkin, Genton, and Ronchetti
(2016). The robust model is a semiparametric model that relaxes the distributional assumptions
of a Heckman selection model and produces consistent estimates when those assumptions are
not met. The full results of the robust model appear in Table 4 in the appendix. The robust
results largely mirror the results presented in Table 2, though we note in the text below when
the findings from the two models diverge.
[Table 2 about here.]
Stage 1 Results
Before turning to a test of our hypotheses in the second stage of the model, we describe the
results in the first stage. The dependent variable is a binary measure of whether a state adopted
a given policy in a given year. The results fall largely in line with previous results from the
diffusion literature. A negative coefficient estimate for the ideological distance variable indi-
cates that as the distance between the innovating and observed state increases, the observed
state becomes decreasingly likely to adopt the policy. The coefficient estimates for the model
legislation, bordering states, and income variables are positively signed and statistically sig-
nificant. Respectively, these results indicate that states are more likely to adopt policies with
interest group model legislation behind it; that states are more likely to adopt when a neigh-
boring state has already adopted the policy; and that wealthier states are more likely to adopt
diffusing policies (though the estimate for this coefficient fails to reach statistical significance
in Model 2). The government ideology variable is negatively signed.20 Taken at face value, this
finding might suggest that more conservative governments are more likely to adopt diffusing
policy innovations than liberal states, all else equal. However, we limit our interpretation of this
finding to mean that more conservative governments were more likely than liberal governments
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to adopt the 12 policies in our sample. A more definitive conclusion about whether liberal or
conservative governments are more likely to adopt diffusing policy innovations overall would
require a more representative sample of all policies considered at the state level than those in
our current sample. The models produce null results for the time variables.
Overall, the results from the first stage accord with predictions from previous studies of
policy diffusion. The results were also consistent across all models. Further, the inverse Mills
ratio was statistically significant in all models (see Table 2). The inverse Mills ratio measures
the correlation between the errors in Stage 1 and Stage 2; if significant it demonstrates that
there is indeed selection bias and the use of the Heckman model is justified to model the
selection process.
Stage 2 Results
We turn to interpreting the second stage of the model, which seeks to explain the extent to
which states borrow language from previous states, given that they have selected into adopting
a given policy. The dependent variable is Similarity Score, which is the cosine similarity score
between the text of the adopting state’s policy and the most similar text from a previously
adopting state.
The professionalism hypothesis states that as legislative professionalism increases, policy
language in approved bills will become less similar to the policy language approved in previously
adopting states. If this is true, we should expect to see a negative and statistically significant
coefficient estimate for the professionalism variable in the second stage of Models 1 and 2.
Turning to the results in the lower panel of Table 2, this is indeed what we find in Model 1.
An increase in legislative professionalism is associated with reduced similarity scores. In sub-
stantive terms, the coefficient estimate indicates that a one-unit increase in the index (roughly
the difference between an average state legislature like Iowa’s and a fairly professional legisla-
ture like Illinois’ on Squire’s measure) translates to bills with an average decrease of 3.49 in the
similarity score. Moving from the least professional legislature (New Hampshire, Squire index
= 0.27) to the most professional (California, Squire index = 6.26), Model 1 predicts that a bill
would have a similarity score 20.7 lower in comparison to previous adopters in California than
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it would in New Hampshire. On a 0 to 100 scale, this represents a substantively large reduction
in language borrowing as professionalism increases.
Using Bowen and Greene’s index as an alternate measure, we find a similar negative and
statistically significant relationship in Model 2.21 Use of this time-dynamic index indicates a
decrease of 2.33 in the similarity score for a one-unit increase in the index. The difference in
predicted cosine similarity scores between California and New Hampshire is 13.96—a smaller
difference than predicted using Squire’s index, but substantively large nonetheless. The results
from both Model 1 and 2 support the professionalism hypothesis.
We turn next to testing the hypotheses for the component variables of professionalism. First,
the expenditures hypothesis holds that states that spend more on staff will borrow less language
from previously adopting states. If this is true, we should see a negative and statistically sig-
nificant coefficient estimate for the Staff Expenditures variable in Model 3. We find supporting
evidence based on the estimates. Increasing staff expenditures per legislator by $100,000, which
is about the difference between an average state legislature like Arizona and a fairly professional
legislature like Oregon, translates to an average decrease in a cosine similarity score of 4.8, con-
trolling for the other variables. Moving from the lowest per legislator expenditure in 2010 (New
Hampshire, $70,000 per legislator) to the highest (California, $5,523,000 per legislator), yields
an average decrease in the cosine similarity score of 26.2—more than a quarter of the range of
the 0-100 scores.
Next, the session hypothesis holds that states that allow their legislatures to meet for more
days will borrow less language from previously adopting states. Like the expenditures hypoth-
esis, if this is true, we should see a negative and statistically significant coefficient estimate for
Session Length in Model 4. The results show that the longer a state legislature is in session,
the less language the legislature copies and pastes from other states. Based on the coefficient
estimate in Model 4, we calculate that increasing session lengths by 30 days per biennium leads
to a small average decrease of 0.9 in the cosine similarity score. The difference between a rarely
meeting legislature, like Wyoming (40 days in 2009-2010), and a legislature with no meeting
limits, like New York (458 days in 2009-2010), is a decrease of 12.5 in cosine similarity score on
average.
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Finally, the salary hypothesis holds that the salary paid to legislators should have no re-
lationship with the amount of language borrowing. If this is true, the coefficient estimate for
the Salary variable in Model 5 should not be statistically different from zero. In contrast with
our expectation, we find that the coefficient estimate for the salary variable is negative and
statistically significant. Our calculations show that a $10,000 increase in legislative salary is as-
sociated with a decrease in cosine similarity score of 0.7, on average. The difference between the
best-paid legislature in 2010 (California, salary of $213,000) and the worst-paid (New Mexico,
$0) results in a decrease of 14.91 in the average cosine similarity score.22
Given the unexpected results in Model 5, we conducted a placebo test to determine whether
the statistically significant relationship between salary and text copying was being driven by the
correlation between salary and staff expenditures. Model 6 reports the results of this placebo
test, as we ran the model including all three component variables jointly. Among the three com-
ponent variables in Model 6, only the estimate for staff expenditures is negative and statistically
significant. Once all components are taken into account in the same model, neither a longer
session length nor a higher salary appears to be associated with decreased language borrowing.
Moreover, the negative relationship between staff expenditures and language borrowing is sub-
stantively large. Increasing staff expenditures per legislator by $100,000 results in an average
decrease in a cosine similarity score of 3.9, controlling for the other variables. In sum, Model
6 produces evidence in support of the expenditures hypotheses, robust to controlling for the
other components of professionalism. However, we note that we do not obtain similar evidence
from the robust sample selection model in Table 4. Though the size and sign of the coefficient
estimate remain similar, the robust estimate is not statistically significant. The model provides
no additional evidence in favor of the session hypothesis. It does provide evidence in support of
our salary hypothesis, which predicted a null relationship between salary and policy language
borrowing.23
The control variable estimates in the second stage of the model are consistent in size and
significance across all model specifications. We find that the coefficient estimate for the term
limits variable is signed in a positive direction, but the estimate is not statistically significant
at the .05 level of confidence. The coefficient estimate for time is positive and statistically
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significant, indicating that copying policy language becomes more common as the years after
the initial policy innovation increase. We also find a consistently positive and significant result
for order of adoption. Together, these findings are consistent with a policy convergence in-
terpretation of reinvention in which, after an early period of adjustment and experimentation,
states settle on a common set of policy tenets over time.
We find a positive association between the presence of model legislation on an issue and
language borrowing, statistically significant in all six models. In Model 1, the coefficient es-
timate suggests that when an external organization distributes model legislation on a policy,
the cosine similarity score increases by roughly nine points on the 0-100 scale, controlling for
the other variables. These findings suggest that organizations that promulgate model bills can
leverage a good deal of influence over the contents of a policy adoptions.
Overall, the results show that greater legislative professionalism is associated with less copy-
ing. Of the models presented in Table 2, Model 2 (estimating Bowen and Greene’s profession-
alism index alone) best fit the data based on BIC scores. The model fit statistics suggest that
professionalism, rather than any individual component, is the best predictor of more original
text. Among the component variables, staff expenditures appear to be the strongest predictor
of more original text, given the findings in Model 6. However, we point to this finding as
suggestive rather than conclusive; we are hesitant to draw the definitive conclusion that staff
expenditures are the driving force due to the lack of significance for the coefficient estimate in
the robust model.
Interpreting the Estimated Effects on Similarity Score
The cosine measure, while ideal for detecting copy and paste plagiarism between state bills,
remains somewhat abstract. To provide context to the results from Table 2, we illustrate
differences in pairs of bills that exist in the dataset. Recall Figure 1 above, which shows a
portion of the Texas and Indiana safe haven laws. The similarity score between the two bills
is 71.2, or 28.8 less than an exact match. A difference of 28.8 mirrors the estimated effect
size for staff expenditures when you move from the lowest to the highest state. The two bills
exhibit similar language, and there is some evidence that Indiana used Texas’ law as a starting
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template. However, Indiana’s law provides looser language on the age requirement for taking
infants into custody, saying that the infant must appear to be 30 days of age. The Indiana
bill also includes language to protect the identity of the person who left the infant. Indiana
reinvented key portions of the Texas bill, while still using very similar language overall. Our
estimates suggest that states with large staff budgets have the capacity to customize policy
to a similar degree, while states with smaller staff budgets will have more difficulty making
important changes.
[Figure 2 about here.]
To illustrate the effect of session length, we provide Figure 2 which shows a portion of the
2005 Florida stand your ground law compared to Oklahoma’s 2011 version. The cosine similarity
between these two bills is 88.0, or about 12.0 less than an exact match. A difference of 12.0
is similar to the estimated effect size for session length. While these two bills are remarkably
similar, Oklahoma expanded Florida’s law by providing legal protection to those using deadly
force for self-protection while at work. Substantively, this is an extremely important expansion
of the policy, since it defines the boundaries of legal jeopardy for people using deadly force.
Tying this pair of bills back to professionalism, our estimates suggest that states with long
session lengths will be better able to reinvent policy than states with short sessions, even if
that means copying most of the bill text from another state and including a few key changes,
as Oklahoma did with Florida’s stand your ground law.
Results for Model Legislation Split-Sample
Recall from Table 2 the effect of model legislation. Controlling for the usual causes of policy
adoption, as well as the potential influences on borrowing language, model legislation stands
out as a positive, significant, and consistent predictor of both adoption and language borrowing.
It could be argued, though, that model legislation is not a truly exogenous predictor. In-
stead, it could be that state A borrowed from model legislation, so state B, by borrowing from
state A, is actually borrowing in part from an interest group model bill. Previous scholarship
has provided evidence that this is indeed how the process unfolds (Garrett & Jansa 2015). It
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could also be the case that all states are borrowing from the model bill, and therefore only ap-
pear to be borrowing from each other through the nature of our research design. Our approach
assumes that the existence of model legislation would create more borrowing overall without
explicitly modeling the decision of whether to borrow from peer bills or interest group model
bills. We believe this is a safe assumption and should not affect the central claim of the paper—
that greater legislative professionalism leads to more reinvention, and less borrowing, all else
equal. But, for this claim to hold we need to be sure that states’ tendency to borrow more
language on policies with model legislation are not driving our results. In order to examine this
possibility, we re-ran our models from table 2 after splitting our sample of policies into those
with and without model legislation.
We present the coefficient estimates from the second-stage of the re-estimated model 2 in
Figure 3 using the split-sample.24 We find that for policies with and without model legislation,
professionalism is still a significant predictor of less-borrowing overall. We can infer that, if
presented with a model bill, or with a policy diffusing across the states based on a model bill, a
professional legislature is significantly more likely to make changes to the policy than a citizen
legislature. The effect size mirrors what was found in the overall sample.25
[Figure 3 about here.]
Discussion and Implications
This study provides evidence that reducing the resources available to lawmakers for policymak-
ing incentivizes lawmakers to copy and paste language from previous adopters, and therefore
disincentivizes policy reinvention. We find that citizen legislatures copy more language from
previous adopters, while more professional legislatures have greater capacity to reinvent diffus-
ing policies for their jurisdictions. The principal reason for this increased reinvention capacity
appears to be higher staff expenditures, though we cannot rule out that session length and
salary play a role as well.
Similar to Carley et al. (2016), our study takes a step in the direction of explaining how
variation across states leads to greater or less reinvention, rather than explaining how com-
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prehensive policies become over time. Existing studies of reinvention tend to examine the
reinvention of single policies as they diffuse across states (Carley et al. 2016; Glick and Hays
1991; Mooney and Lee 1995; Taylor et al. 2012, though see Hays 1996). In contrast, our study
examines the diffusion and reinvention of 12 policies over time.
Our study also introduces a new technique for measuring policy reinvention, using cosine
similarity scores to calculate a continuous measure of text copying. Cosine similarity provides
an objective measurement of reinvention by taking the bill text in its entirety into account.
The methodological framework could be expanded to language adoption in other venues, such
as in the initiative or referendum process, or in bureaucratic rulemaking.
Our results suggest that scholars of legislative politics should pay greater attention to the
role of expediency in the policymaking process. Conventional accounts of lawmaking tend to
portray policy outcomes as the result of focused bargaining that satisfies the preferences of a
legislative majority. In contrast, the results here suggest that lawmakers, especially when facing
resource constraints and competing demands on their attention, are willing to implement quick
fixes to complex problems.
The factors that affect legislative capacity for independent policymaking are important to
understand. Increasingly, journalistic and scholarly attention has focused on problems created
by underresourced democratic institutions (e.g. Drutman 2015; Klein 2015; Lindsey & Teles
2017). Independent policymaking capacity is necessary for a legislature to be insulated from
undue influence of outside sources (Drutman 2014), and to effectively represent their citizens
in the policy process. While legislatures with more funding for staff have a greater ability
to research, deliberate, and innovate when creating policy solutions for difficult social and
economic problems, legislatures that have reduced or restrained staff expenditures are more
likely to depend on the innovations formulated in other states, and for other citizens, in different
circumstances. Yet, additional spending on legislative institutions is unlikely to be met with
popular support, with trust in government at all time lows and state budgets already strained.
Nonetheless, it remains important to understand that diminishing spending on legislatures
and their staffs has consequences for their ability to fully function as independent democratic
institutions.
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Notes
1These provisions had previously been passed, using similar language, in South Carolina and
Texas, respectively.
2Information for this example from Griffin. 2015. “Religious Freedom Restoration Acts.”
NCSL Legisbrief. Accessed online at http://ncsl.org/documents/legisbriefs/2015/lb2317.pdf,
February 9, 2018; Cook and Eason. 2015. ”Governor Mike Pence signs RFRA fix.” Indianapolis
Star. Accessed online at https://www.indystar.com/story/news/politics/2015/04/01/indiana-
rfra-deal-sets-limited-protections-for-lgbt/70766920/, February 7, 2018; Kim. 2015. “Indiana
Pizza Restaurant Says It Wouldn’t Cater a Gay Wedding, Supports Religious Freedom Law.”
ABC News. Accessed online at http://abcnews.go.com/Business/indiana-pizza-restaurant-cater-
gay-wedding-supports-religious/story?id=30045085, February 7, 2018.
3Associated Press. 2014. ”Mo. Governor Vetoes Bill Requiring Criminal Background Checks
For Obamacare Navigators.” Associated Press. Accessed online at http://stlouis.cbslocal.com/2014/07/08/mo-
governor-vetoes-bill-requiring-criminal-background-checks-for-obamacare-navigators/, Septem-
ber 29, 2017.
4Hays (1996) suggests less professional legislatures reinvent more, but finds inconclusive
evidence in support of the hypothesis based on the diffusion of three policies: child abuse
protections, victim compensation, and public campaign funding.
5Tables 8 and 9 in the Appendix provide the list of states that adopted and the year in
which they adopted.
6Sampling in this manner gave use variation in ideology (4 conservative policies, 4 liberal
policies, 4 moderate policies), issue type (6 economic policies, 6 social policies), model legislation
(6 with model legislation, 6 without), time periods (as early as 1982 and as late as 2014) and
diffusion speed (in as little as 2 years or as many as 27 years).
7While some interest groups and interstate organizations make their model legislation pub-
licly available on their websites, others deliberately keep their model legislation private. To
identify model legislation associated with each of our twelve policies, we conducted web searches,
reviewed media coverage of legislative debates, and in one case contacted a lobbyist to confirm
our suspicions about the presence of model legislation. We cannot be absolutely certain that no
model legislation exists for the six policies we code as lacking it. However, for these six policies
we could find no evidence that political organizations created relevant model legislation.
8When original bill language was not available online, we used the language from the state
session law corresponding to the bill.
9Each text file was scrubbed of idiosyncrasies including numbers, symbols, punctuation, gen-
eral whitespace, and bill preambles when applicable. We also converted all words to lowercase
letters and removed common English stopwords like “the” and “of.”
10This was done using the tm, smdc, stringr packages in R, which produces an adjacency
matrix of similarity scores by comparing each bill text to every other bill text. A separate
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matrix was produced for each issue.
11O’Connor (2012) explains that cosine similarity can be thought of as a normalized inner
product or a correlation between vectors of paired samples.
12Literally, the similarity scores are the cosine of the angle between the two vectors of words,
hence the name cosine similarity. The smaller the score, the larger is the angle between the
two texts, and the less similar are the two texts. This interpretation is less intuitive, but can
be used to graph the similarity of texts in Euclidean space.
13First adopters are assigned similarity values of “0,” as there is no previous adopter.
14A potential concern with this method is that it constitutes selection on the dependent
variable. However, we do not limit our sample based on likely instances of copying. Rather,
we use a consistent rule for measuring the potential for copying across all observations of bill
adoption in the second stage. Even the most likely instance of copying for the state does not
mean the obtained score suggests that copying is likely. The values of similarity scores in the
second stage of our model range from 0 to 100, and the median similarity score is 0.65—meaning
the second stage contains bills ranging from exact replicas of previous bills to bills that share
very little in common with any other bill.
15The mean similarity score for all policies is 0.63 and for safe haven laws is 0.59.
16We multiply Squire’s index by 10 in the following results to make interpretation of the
coefficient estimates easier.
17Descriptive statistics of all model variables are available in Table 5 in the Appendix
18California’s 1994 adoption of the Three Strikes law is omitted from these results because
the law was adopted by citizen initiative, rather than through the legislative process.
19We found systematic differences in the amount of average text copying across our twelve
policies. To make sure these differences were not distorting our results, we also ran each model
with fixed effects by policy in the first stage, second stage, and both stages. The inclusion of
fixed effects makes few differences to the substantive results. In the appendix, we illustrate
the variation in average copying across policies in Figure 4 and provide the results of the fixed
effects models in Table 3 in the Appendix.
20In Table 6 of the Appendix, we present results using a measure of party control and party
distance rather than government ideology. The results remain largely similar using this measure.
21Unlike Squire’s measure, the Bowen and Greene measure is time-dynamic. There are 32
observations (or 8%) missing from the Bowen and Greene measure. These are unable to be
imputed in a Heckman selection model.
22To be sure our results weren’t being driven by California’s high professionalism, we re-
estimated the models without California. The models without California produced the same
substantive results.
23We examined the variance inflation factor (VIF) for each of the professionalism components
in Model 6, Stage 2 to assess the severity of multicollinearity between each measure. Severe
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multicollinearity could lead to inflated standard errors and, therefore, could be driving the
statistically insignificant coefficient estimates for session length and salary. The VIFs for staff
expenditures (VIF = 1.99), session length (VIF = 1.81), and salary (VIF = 2.64) were not
severe enough to explain the non-significant coefficient estimates for session length and salary.
A VIF of 10 or higher is considered severe.
24We focus on Model 2 because it was the best fitting and most parsimonious model, though
we obtained similar results to those presented in table 2 for models 1, 3, 4, 5, and 6 as well.
25The full results for the re-estimated model 2 are presented in table 7 in the Appendix.
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Figure 1: Bill Text Comparison, Safe Haven Laws
Note: Cosine similarity between these two bills is 0.71, or 0.29 from a perfect match.
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Figure 2: Bill Text Comparison, Stand Your Ground Laws
Note: Cosine similarity between these two bills is 0.88, or 0.12 from a perfect match.
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Figure 3: Estimated Effect of Professionalism on Text Borrowing, for Policies with and
without Model Legislation
Note: Circles represent the coefficient estimate for each variable. Capped lines represent the confidence
intervals at the 95% level of confidence. Coefficient estimates from the second stage of Heckman selection
model. Second stage dependent variable is similarity score. See Table 7 in the Appendix for the full results.
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Figure 4: Average Cosine Similarity by Policy
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Table 1: Policy Descriptions
Policy Years Description
Asbestos Transparency 2013-2014 Requires victims of asbestos exposure to disclose personal information when
making compensation claims. Model bill by ALEC.
Anti-bullying 1999-2014 Mandates that school districts adopt an anti-bullying policy and lists which
minority groups (if any) will be specifically protected. Model bill by GLSEN.
Stand Your Ground 2005-2014 Allows individuals to use deadly force in self-defense, and specifies the loca-
tions where an individual may use deadly force. Model bill by ALEC.
Electronic Transac-
tions
1999-2009 Institutes best practices for electronic transactions, such as recognizing the
legitimacy of electronic signatures on contracts and other legal agreements.
Model bill by NCCUSL.
E-Cigarette Bans 2009-2014 Prohibits the sale of e-cigarettes to minors. Model bill by Reynolds American.
E-Waste Recycling 2003-2011 Regulates the recycling of televisions, computers, batteries, and other used
electronics. Specifies the conditions in which the manufacturer and/or con-
sumer would assume the costs of collection and disposal. Model bill by Dell
and Electronic TakeBack.
Three Strikes 1993-1995 Prescribes life sentences to individuals with three felony convictions.
I’m Sorry Laws 1986-2014 Specifies that apologies from medical professionals are not necessarily admis-
sions of guilt and is not sufficient evidence for being found guilty of malprac-
tice.
Safe Haven Laws 1999-2008 Allows fire fighters and other emergency medical personnel to assume tempo-
rary custody of abandoned babies. Provides protections for individuals who
leave babies with authorities. Specifies the proper procedure for turning the
baby over to child protective services.
Guaranteed Insurance
Renewal
1992-1998 Requires insurance companies to renew insurance policies regardless of the
policyholder’s claim history.
School Vouchers 1990-2013 Programs that allow students to pay for private schooling using public funds
under certain conditions, such as inadequate public schools or special educa-
tion needs.
LGBT Employment
Nondiscrimination
1982-2009 Prevents employers from discriminating against employees due to their sexual
orientation.
Note: ALEC = American Legislative Exchange Council; GLSEN = Gay, Lesbian, and Straight Education Network; NCCUSL =
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
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Table 2: Selection Model of Policy Language Diffusion
(Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) (Model 4) (Model 5) (Model 6)
Stage 1: DV = Adopted Policy
Ideological -0.63∗ -0.59∗ -0.62∗ -0.59∗ -0.63∗ -0.59∗
Distance (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17)
Government -0.68∗ -0.69∗ -0.69∗ -0.69∗ -0.69∗ -0.70∗
Ideology (0.19) (0.20) (0.20) (0.19) (0.19) (0.17)
Model Legislation 0.22∗ 0.25∗ 0.23∗ 0.26∗ 0.23∗ 0.25∗
(0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08)
Border 0.69∗ 0.67∗ 0.69∗ 0.67∗ 0.69∗ 0.68∗
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07)
Per Capita Income 0.20∗ 0.19∗ 0.20∗ 0.18∗ 0.20∗ 0.19∗
(in $10,000s) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
Time -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02)
Time2 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant -1.89∗ -1.95∗ -1.90∗ -1.92∗ -1.90∗ -1.94∗
(0.20) (0.21) (0.20) (0.21) (0.20) (0.21)
Stage 2: DV = Similarity Score
Professionalism -3.49∗
(Squire) (0.64)
Professionalism -2.33∗
(Bowen & Greene) (0.39)
Staff -0.48∗ -0.39∗
Expenditures (in $100s) (0.07) (0.13)
Session -0.03∗ -0.00
Length (0.01) (0.01)
Salary -0.07∗ -0.02
(in $1000s) (0.02) (0.03)
Term Limits 3.25 3.39 3.72 2.68 3.51 3.54
(2.26) (2.27) (2.30) (2.34) (2.31) (2.27)
Time 0.87∗ 0.84∗ 0.87∗ 0.83∗ 0.90∗ 0.84∗
(0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.20) (0.19) (0.19)
Order 0.40∗ 0.42∗ 0.39∗ 0.43∗ 0.39∗ 0.41∗
(0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.14) (0.12) (0.12)
Model Legislation 9.63∗ 9.19∗ 9.96∗ 8.64∗ 9.81∗ 9.45∗
(1.73) (1.86) (1.78) (2.00) (1.74) (1.87)
Constant 71.42∗ 64.14∗ 67.27∗ 70.43∗ 68.97∗ 67.39∗
(9.37) (10.66) (9.30) (11.68) (9.76) (10.22)
Observations 5263 5263 5263 5263 5263 5263
Uncensored Obs. 384 356 382 356 382 356
BIC 5986.38 5609.51 5956.34 5617.58 5961.28 5624.74
Inverse Mills Ratio -10.82∗ -10.14∗ -10.29∗ -11.37∗ -11.12∗ -9.812∗
(4.67) (5.13) (4.68) (5.70) (4.78) (4.97)
Note: *p≤ .05. Robust clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Significance tests are two-tailed.
Differences in N-size in the second stage due to missing values from Bowen and Greene’s (2014) data.
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Table 3: Selection Model of Policy Language Diffusion with Policy Fixed Effects
(Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) (Model 4) (Model 5) (Model 6)
Stage 1: DV = Adopted Policy
Ideological -0.37∗ -0.29 -0.34 -0.28 -0.35∗ -0.31
Distance (0.17) (0.17) (0.18) (0.16) (0.17) (0.18)
Government -0.38 -0.37 -0.38 -0.35 -0.37 -0.39
Ideology (0.21) (0.22) (0.23) (0.21) (0.21) (0.23)
Model Legislation 0.24∗ 0.28∗ 0.25∗ 0.29∗ 0.25∗ 0.27∗
(0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
Border 0.56∗ 0.56∗ 0.57∗ 0.54∗ 0.56∗ 0.57∗
(0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.08)
Per Capita Income 0.17∗ 0.15∗ 0.15∗ 0.13∗ 0.16∗ 0.15∗
(in $10,000s) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Time 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Time2 -0.00∗ -0.00∗ -0.00∗ -0.00∗ -0.00∗ -0.00∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant -2.03∗ -2.06∗ -2.00∗ -2.01∗ -2.03∗ -2.06∗
(0.17) (0.16) (0.17) (0.15) (0.17) (0.16)
Stage 2: DV = Similarity Score
Professionalism -2.97∗
(Squire) (0.64)
Professionalism -1.65∗
(Bowen & Greene) (0.43)
Staff -0.33∗ -0.22
Expenditures (0.10) (0.16)
Session -0.02∗ 0.00
Length (0.01) (0.01)
Salary -0.05∗ -0.03
(0.02) (0.03)
Term Limits 3.16 3.29 3.27 2.77 3.33 3.38
(1.97) (2.09) (2.15) (2.09) (2.07) (2.11)
Time 1.77∗ 1.73∗ 1.74∗ 1.74∗ 1.82∗ 1.80∗
(0.45) (0.48) (0.50) (0.50) (0.47) (0.49)
Order -0.01 -0.04 -0.03 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05
(0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14)
Model Legislation 7.53 7.14 6.73 6.69 7.58 8.65
(9.22) (10.31) (11.08) (10.25) (9.83) (11.01)
Policy Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 92.53∗ 89.59∗ 91.49∗ 94.86∗ 92.02∗ 89.34∗
(15.19) (17.07) (18.54) (16.25) (16.20) (19.09)
Observations 5263 5263 5263 5263 5263 5263
Uncensored Obs. 384 356 382 356 382 356
BIC 5960.89 5580.25 5931.97 5587.04 5932.32 5595.72
Inverse Mills Ratio -10.82∗ -24.87∗ -10.29∗ -11.37∗ -11.12∗ -9.82∗
(4.67) (5.08) (4.68) (5.70) (4.77) (4.97)
Note: *p≤ .05. Robust clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Significance tests are two-tailed.
Differences in N-size in the second stage due to missing values from Bowen and Greene’s (2014) data.
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Table 4: Robust Selection Model of Policy Language Diffusion
(Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) (Model 4) (Model 5) (Model 6)
Stage 1: DV = Adopted Policy
Ideological -0.50∗ -0.50∗ -0.50∗ -0.50∗ -0.50∗ -0.50∗
Distance (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19)
Government -0.94∗ -0.94∗ -0.94∗ -0.94∗ -0.94∗ -0.94∗
Ideology (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18)
Model Legislation 0.29∗ 0.29∗ 0.29∗ 0.29∗ 0.29∗ 0.29∗
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Border 0.74∗ 0.74∗ 0.74∗ 0.74∗ 0.74∗ 0.74∗
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Per Capita Income 0.22∗ 0.22∗ 0.22∗ 0.22∗ 0.22∗ 0.22∗
(in $10,000s) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Time -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02)
Time2 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant -1.97∗ -1.97∗ -1.97∗ -1.97∗ -1.97∗ -1.97∗
(0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24)
Stage 2: DV = Similarity Score
Professionalism -2.18∗
(Squire) (0.82)
Professionalism -1.48∗
(Bowen & Greene) (0.63)
Staff -0.29∗ -0.21
Expenditures (in $100s) (0.14) (0.19)
Session -0.02∗ -0.01
Length (0.01) (0.01)
Salary -0.04∗ -0.01
(in $1000s) (0.02) (0.03)
Term Limits 4.36∗ 4.46∗ 4.30∗ 4.29∗ 4.48∗ 4.39∗
(2.01) (2.01) (1.99) (2.08) (2.01) (2.06)
Time 0.53∗ 0.52∗ 0.52∗ 0.50∗ 0.52∗ 0.52∗
(0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
Order 0.33∗ 0.33∗ 0.33∗ 0.34∗ 0.33∗ 0.33∗
(0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Model Legislation 7.26∗ 7.34∗ 7.42∗ 7.08∗ 7.32∗ 7.38∗
(2.18) (2.17) (2.15) (2.14) (2.14) (2.15)
Constant 67.18∗ 62.92∗ 64.89∗ 65.96∗ 65.32∗ 65.96∗
(6.79) (6.39) (6.61) (6.59) (6.50) (6.63)
Inverse Mills Ratio -6.55∗ -6.28† -6.34† -6.28† -6.44∗ -6.25†
(3.23) (3.22) (3.26) (3.24) (3.17) (3.22)
Note: *p≤ .05, †p≤ .10. Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance tests are two-tailed.
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Table 5: Descriptive Statistics for Model Variables
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Ideological Distance 0.31 0.21 0 0.86
Government Ideology 0.52 0.23 0 0.95
Model Legislation 0.31 0.46 0 1
Border 0.28 0.45 0 1
Per Capita Income (in $10,000s) 3.58 0.65 1.92 5.95
Time 7.99 7.33 0 28
Professionalism (Squire) 1.7 1.1 0.27 6.3
Professionalism (Bowen & Greene) -0.02 1.45 -1.85 8.56
Staff Expenditures (in $100,000s) 6.48 7.04 0.48 55.23
Session Length 145.39 85.98 36 549.54
Salary (in $1,000s) 53.77 46.44 0 254.94
Order 14.38 12.30 0 49
Similarity Score 63.42 22.22 0 99.22
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Table 6: Selection Model of Policy Language Diffusion with Party Control
(Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) (Model 4) (Model 5) (Model 6)
Stage 1: DV = Adopted Policy
Party -0.33∗ -0.29∗ -0.32∗ -0.29∗ -0.32∗ -0.29∗
Distance (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Party -0.31∗ -0.32∗ -0.31∗ -0.32∗ -0.31∗ -0.32∗
Control (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Model Legislation 0.21∗ 0.25∗ 0.22∗ 0.25∗ 0.22∗ 0.25∗
(0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08)
Border 0.69∗ 0.67∗ 0.69∗ 0.67∗ 0.69∗ 0.67∗
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Per Capita Income 0.18∗ 0.18∗ 0.18∗ 0.17∗ 0.18∗ 0.18∗
(in $10,000s) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Time -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Time2 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant -2.10∗ -2.15∗ -2.11∗ -2.13∗ -2.11∗ 2.15∗
(0.18) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19)
Stage 2: DV = Similarity Score
Professionalism -3.54∗
(Squire) (0.66)
Professionalism -2.44∗
(Bowen & Greene) (0.37)
Staff -0.49∗ -0.39∗
Expenditures (0.07) (0.13)
Session -0.03∗ -0.00
Length (0.01) (0.01)
Salary -0.07∗ -0.02
(0.02) (0.03)
Term Limits 4.05 4.28 4.52 3.50 4.41∗ 4.43∗
(2.21) (2.20) (2.23) (2.31) (2.21) (2.20)
Time 0.83∗ 0.81∗ 0.82∗ 0.80∗ 0.86∗ 0.81∗
(0.18) (0.19) (0.19) (0.20) (0.18) (0.19)
Order 0.45∗ 0.46∗ 0.44∗ 0.47∗ 0.44∗ 0.45∗
(0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.14) (0.12) (0.13)
Model Legislation 10.26∗ 10.52∗ 8.64∗ 9.16∗ 10.44∗ 9.93∗
(1.57) (1.65) (1.62) (1.77) (1.54) (1.68)
Constant 67.03∗ 60.84∗ 63.46∗ 67.13∗ 64.71∗ 64.30∗
(8.30) (9.90) (8.40) (11.22) (8.45) (9.68)
Observations 5136 5136 5136 5136 5136 5136
Uncensored Obs. 378 350 376 350 376 350
BIC 5896.74 5521.70 5867.30 5530.40 5871.68 5537.06
Inverse Mills Ratio -25.17∗ -25.46∗ -25.68∗ -26.60∗ -25.95∗ -24.87∗
(4.53) (4.58) (4.88) (4.32) (4.43) (5.07)
Note: *p≤ .05. Robust clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Significance tests are two-tailed. Differences in N-size in the
second stage due to missing values from Bowen and Greene’s (2014) data.
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Table 7: Selection Models of Policy Language Diffusion, By Model Legislation Sub-Sample
Policies with Policies without
Model Legislation Model Legislation
Stage 1: DV = Policy Adoption
Ideological -1.17∗ -0.01
Distance (0.24) (-0.22)
Government -0.84∗ -0.42
Ideology (0.27) (0.22)
Border -0.01 0.81∗
(-0.08) (0.09)
Per Capita Income -0.08 0.43∗
(0.05) (0.08)
Time 0.35∗ -0.09∗
(0.04) (0.01)
Time2 -0.02∗ 0.00∗
(0.00) (0.00)
Constant -0.89∗ -2.78∗
(0.23) (0.32)
Stage 2: DV = Similarity Score
Professionalism -2.09∗ -2.36∗
(Bowen & Greene) (0.51) (0.42)
Term Limits 0.99 10.22∗
(2.39) (3.17)
Time 0.10 0.78∗
(1.07) (0.19)
Order 0.22 0.40∗
(0.19) (0.14)
Constant 107.30∗ 54.73∗
(7.83) (9.45)
Observations 1660 3959
Uncensored Obs. 188 168
BIC 2758.77 2773.57
Inverse Mills Ratio -28.38∗ -6.09
(3.67) (4.69)
Note: *p≤ .05. Robust clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Significance tests are two-tailed.
40
Table 8: Policy Adoption Dates for Policies with Model Legislation
Policy Adopters (Year)
Asbestos Trans-
parency
AZ (2015) OH (2013) OK (2013) TN (2016) TX (2015) UT (2016)
WI (2014) WV (2015)
Anti-bullying AK (2006) AL (2009) AR (2003) AZ (2005) CA (2003) CO (2001)
CT (2002) DE (2007) FL (2008) GA (1999) HI (2011) IA (2007) ID
(2006) IL (2001) IN (2005) KS (2007) KY (2008) LA (2001) MA
(2010) MD (2005) ME (2005) MI (2011) MN (2007) MO (2010) MS
(2001) NC (2009) ND (2011) NE (2008) NH (2000) NJ (2002) NV
(2005) NY (2010) OH (2006) OK (2002) OR (2001) PA (2007) RI
(2003) SC (2006) SD (2012) TN (2005) TX (2005) UT (2008) VA
(2005) VT (2004) WA (2002) WI (2010) WV (2001) WY (2009)
Stand Your Ground AK (2007) AL (2006) AZ (2006) CO (2012) FL (2005) GA (2006)
IN (2006) KS (2006) KY (2006) LA (2006) ME (2007) MI (2006)
MO (2010) MS (2006) MT (2009) NC (2011) ND (2007) NH (2011)
NJ (2012) NV (2011) OH (2008) OK (2011) PA (2011) SC (2006)
SD (2005) TN (2007) TX (2007) UT (2010) WA (2011) WI (2011)
WV (2008)
Electronic Transac-
tions
AK (2004) AL (2001) AR (2001) AZ (2000) CA (1999) CO (2002)
CT (2002) DE (2000) FL (2000) GA (2009) HI (2000) IA (2000) ID
(2000) IL (1999) IN (2000) KS (2000) KY (2000) LA (2001) MA
(2004) MD (2000) ME (2000) MI (2000) MN (2000) MO (2003) MS
(2001) MT (2001) NC (2000) ND (2001) NE (2000) NH (2001) NJ
(2001) NM (2001) NV (2001) NY (1999) OH (2000) OK (2000) OR
(2001) PA (1999) RI (2000) SC (2004) SD (2000) TN (2001) TX
(2001) UT (2000) VA (2000) VT (2003) WA (1996) WI (2004) WV
(2001) WY (2001)
E-Waste Recycling CA (2003) CT (2007) HI (2008) IL (2008) IN (2009) MD (2005)
ME (2004) MI (2008) MN (2007) MO (2008) NC (2007) NJ (2008)
NY (2010) OK (2008) OR (2007) PA (2010) RI (2008) SC (2007)
TX (2007) UT (2011) VA (2008) VT (2009) WA (2006) WI (2009)
WV (2010)
E-Cig Bans AK (2012) AL (2013) AR (2013) AZ (2013) CA (2010) CO (2014)
CT (2014) DE (2014) FL (2014) GA (2014) HI (2013) IA (2014) ID
(2012) IL (2014) IN (2014) KS (2012) KY (2014) LA (2014) MD
(2012) MI (2014) MN (2010) MO (2014) MS (2013) NC (2013) NE
(2014) NH (2010) NJ (2009) NV (2013) NY (2013) OH (2014) OK
(2014) RI (2014) SC (2013) SD (2014) TN (2011) UT (2010) VA
(2014) VT (2014) WA (2013) WI (2011) WV (2014) WY (2013)
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Table 9: Policy Adoption Dates for Policies without Model Legislation
Policy Adopters (Year)
Safe Haven AK (2008) AL (2000) AR (2001) AZ (2001) CA (2001) CO (2000)
CT (2000) DE (2001) FL (2000) GA (2002) HI (2007) IA (2001) ID
(2001) IL (2001) IN (2000) KS (2006) KY (2002) LA (2003) MA
(2004) MD (2000) ME (2001) MI (2000) MN (2000) MO (2002) MS
(2001) MT (2001) NC (2001) ND (2001) NE (2008) NH (2003) NJ
(2000) NM (2001) NV (2001) NY (2000) OH (2001) OK (2001) OR
(2001) PA (2002) RI (2001) SC (2000) SD (2001) TN (2001) TX
(1999) UT (2001) VA (2003) VT (2005) WA (2002) WI (2001) WV
(2000) WY (2003)
Three Strikes AR (1995) CA (1994) CO (1994) CT (1994) FL (1995) GA (1994)
IN (1994) KS (1994) LA (1994) MD (1994) MT (1995) NC (1994)
ND (1995) NM (1994) NV (1995) PA (1995) SC (1995) TN (1995)
UT (1995) VA (1995) VT (1995) WA (1993) WI (1994)
I’m Sorry AK (2014) AZ (2005) CA (2000) CO (2003) CT (2005) DE (2006)
FL (2001) GA (2005) HI (2007) IA (2006) ID (2006) IL (2005) IN
(2006) LA (2006) MA (1986) MD (2005) ME (2005) MI (2011) MO
(2005) MT (2005) NC (2004) ND (2007) NE (2007) NH (2006) OH
(2004) OK (2004) OR (2003) PA (2013) SC (2006) SD (2005) TX
(1999) UT (2006) VA (2005) VT (2005) WA (2002) WI (2014) WV
(2005) WY (2004)
Guaranteed Insurance
Renewal
AZ (1997) CA (1992) CO (1996) CT (1997) DE (1997) FL (1997)
GA (1995) HI (1997) IA (1995) ID (1994) IL (1997) IN (1998) KS
(1997) KY (1994) LA (1993) MD (1993) ME (1993) MI (1996) MN
(1992) MS (1997) MT (1997) NC (1997) ND (1995) NE (1997) NH
(1992) NJ (1992) NM (1998) NV (1997) NY (1992) OH (1997) OR
(1995) PA (1997) RI (1995) SC (1997) SD (1997) TN (1997) TX
(1997) UT (1995) VA (1996) VT (1997) WA (1993) WI (1997) WV
(1997) WY (1995)
School Vouchers AZ (2011) FL (2001) GA (2007) IN (2011) LA (2008) MS (2012)
NC (2013) OH (2005) UT (2005) OK (2010) WI (1990)
LGBT Employment
Nondiscrimination
CA (1991) CO (2007) CT (1991) DE (2009) HI (1991) IA (2007)
IL (2005) MA (1989) MD (2001) ME (2005) MN (1993) NH (1998)
NJ (1992) NM (2003) NV (1999) NY (2002) OR (2007) RI (1995)
VT (1992) WA (2006) WI (1982)
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